PACS numbers: 43.71. An, 43.71.Ft, 43.71 .Hw ͓KRK͔ The study of infant speech perception was initiated in 1971 by the publication of Eimas et al.' s seminal paper on young infants' discrimination of voicing differences in synthetic consonant-vowel syllables varying in voice-onset-time ͑VOT͒. Since 1971, dozens of experiments have confirmed the initial observation that discrimination of the acoustic correlates of consonant contrasts is discontinuous. That is, not all physically equal steps along synthetic speech continua are equally easy or difficult for infants to discriminate. Rather, depending on the regions in which they fall, some steps are difficult to discriminate, much like the chance levels of performance obtained from adults for within-category differences, whereas other steps are relatively easy to discriminate, much like between-category performance obtained from adults.
The initial account of these findings suggested that infants process speech with mechanisms that are both innate and specifically linguistic. However, since 1971 there has been considerable debate in the literature about the proper level of analysis to invoke to account for infants' discrimination of speech signals. A phonemic account, initially attractive because infants' putative category boundaries closely matched those of their native language environment, was swiftly shown to be untenable by experiments revealing that ͑a͒ many non-native speech contrasts were discriminable by infants, ͑b͒ adults were often unable to discriminate ͑or had reduced sensitivity to͒ these non-native contrasts, and ͑c͒ infants' category boundaries did not always correspond to adult values in the native language. Moreover, many of the same discontinuities in speech discrimination observed in infants were also present in nonhuman animals ͑Kuhl and Miller, 1975 and Miller, , 1978 Padden, 1982, 1983͒ , casting doubt on a phonetic account of speech sound discrimination.
One result of this initial wave of follow-ups to the Eimas et al. ͑1971͒ study was a perspective summarized by Aslin and Pisoni ͑1980͒ in which speech discrimination by infants was accounted for largely by a general auditory rather than a phonetic mechanism. Consistent with the results of animal experiments, this perspective proposed that young infants were able to discriminate speech contrasts without recourse to a phonetic level of analysis by using general auditory mechanisms that were categorical in nature and independent of experience with any native language.
1 The role that experience with a native language played in speech perception was characterized by one of four mechanisms: ͑a͒ maturation-a gradual unfolding that was uninfluenced by experience, ͑b͒ induction-an unfolding that required specific experiences, ͑c͒ attunement-discriminative abilities that were partially present prior to the onset of experience and then shaped by that experience, or ͑d͒ maintenancediscriminative abilities that were fully mature at the onset of experience and were maintained or lost depending on the presence or absence of that experience. It is this last mechanism that Aslin and Pisoni described as a Universal Theory of the development of speech perception.
Nittrouer ͑2001͒ provides several challenges to what she claims are the major tenets of Universal Theory. First, she states, ''Those early studies of infant speech perception led to the widely accepted view that infants are born with sensitivities to phonetic boundaries for all languages ͑i.e., the universal set͒'' ͑p. 1598͒. She then cites apparently contradictory findings from several studies of infants. One study ͑Holmberg et al., 1977͒ found that infants have difficulty discriminating a fricative contrast, while another study ͑Lasky et al., 1975͒ found that infants from a Spanishspeaking environment failed to discriminate a VOT contrast that is used in Spanish but succeeded in discriminating nonnative VOT contrasts that are relevant in English and Thai. Nittrouer concludes, ''In spite of these seemingly contradictory findings, however, the notion of innate phonetic boundaries has persisted'' ͑p. 1599͒.
Ironically The fact that infants in the Lasky et al. ͑1975͒ study discriminated the English and Thai boundaries but not the Spanish boundary, as well as evidence from Streeter ͑1976͒ that infants from a Kikuyu environment discriminated the English boundary that is not used by Kikuyu adults, led Aslin and Pisoni to posit that these discriminations were not the result of a phonetic level of analysis. Rather, these data, along with the results from animal experiments that showed similar VOT boundaries, were taken as evidence for a general auditory-based form of categorical perception in young infants. While Nittrouer summarizes this account of speech categories, she states, ''These variations, however, fail to contradict the basic tenets of the universal theory'' ͑p. 1599͒.
Missing from Nittrouer's ͑2001͒ summary of Universal Theory was how Aslin and Pisoni ͑1980͒ placed this theory in context: ''It is important to note here that we are not claiming that only one of these classes of theories ͓Univer-sal, Attunement, Perceptual Learning͔ will uniquely account for the development of all speech contrasts. Rather, it may be the case that some hybrid of the theories provides the best description of the development of specific classes of speechsound discrimination. In fact, this view of parallel developmental processes appears to be supported by current empirical findings'' ͑pp. 79-80͒. Aslin and Pisoni go on to state, ''The evidence on the development of voicing perception therefore appears to provide good support for the attunement theory'' ͑p. 84͒ ͓emphasis added͔, not the Universal Theory. Finally, Aslin and Pisoni make their position clear: ''From this brief summary of the perception of voicing contrasts in stop consonants, fricatives, vowels, and liquids, it should be apparent that the major roles of early experience that we outlined earlier cannot be uniformly invoked to account for the development of the abilities needed to discriminate all speech contrasts found in spoken language'' ͑p. 88͒.
Nittrouer's ͑2001͒ incomplete and misleading summary of Aslin and Pisoni's ͑1980͒ model of infant speech perception is mirrored in her treatment of more recent models, most notably that of Best ͑1994͒, which outlines several different ways in which classes of speech sounds are affected ͑or not͒ by early experience via a process of perceptual assimilation. Although Best did not adopt the term Universal Theory in her model, a mechanism analogous to maintenance is embedded, in part, in her conceptualization. Similarly, Werker and Tees ͑1984͒, who provided the first time-course data for the change in discriminative performance between 6 and 12 months of age for two non-native consonant contrasts, made it clear that this mechanism of age-related change was not ''loss'' per se ͑Werker, 1995͒, likely occurred through the application of more general learning mechanisms ͑Lalonde and Werker, 1995͒, and was not applicable to all phonetic contrasts ͑see also Best et al., 1988; Polka and Bohn, 1996͒. Moreover, other more recent treatments of the effects of early experience on speech perception by infants ͑Aslin et Jusczyk, 1997; Werker and Tees, 1999͒ provide a much more nuanced view than the one ascribed by Nittrouer ͑2001͒ under the guise of Universal Theory. Indeed, there is likely no one today who would describe the sensitivities shown by the newborn infant as straightforwardly ''innate.'' Werker and Tees ͑1992, 1999͒ characterize the mechanism accounting for newborn sensitivities as one of ''probabilistic epigenesis,'' whereas Jusczyk and Bertoncini ͑1988͒ describe it as one of ''innately guided learning.'' Much of the current research is focused on identifying precisely what the early biases and experiential mechanisms are that bring about both initial discrimination performance and subsequent change, from Jusczyk's WRAPSA model ͑1993͒ to Kuhl's ͑1991͒ Perceptual Magnet Model to Maye et al.' s ͑2002͒ and Anderson and Morgan's ͑2002͒ demonstrations of infants' abilities to use statistical information to alter category structure and to acquire auditory equivalence classes ͑Kuhl, 1983͒. In short, Nittrouer's straw man has no clothes.
The second challenge offered by Nittrouer ͑2001͒ is that infants are much worse at speech sound discrimination than one would expect from a reading of the previous literature. The irony here is that she claims on several occasions ͑in-cluding in the abstract͒ that her ''results did not differ from those reported by others.'' 2 Nevertheless, she states that ''Overall these results fail to provide support for claims that universal phonetic boundaries are in place at birth. It is emphasized that the findings of this study do not really differ from those of others: success rates are similar across studies. What differs is the willingness of authors to use the results to support claims of innate phonetic boundaries'' ͑p. 1603͒. What leads Nittrouer to a different conclusion?
Her primary evidence for rejecting the notion of innate phonetic boundaries, setting aside the aforementioned arguments by some of us that these categories are not initially phonetic per se, is that not all infants succeed in discriminating them. That is, Nittrouer apparently believes that universal means ''in all cases'' and ''for all infants.'' Both of these criteria are misguided. First, we have already made the argument that Nittrouer incorrectly ascribed Universal Theory to all speech contrasts, which was never the claim of this theory since it was proposed in 1980. Thus, the fact that some speech contrasts are easier to discriminate than others simply cannot be used as an argument against Universal Theory, particularly since there are obvious differences in the acoustic salience of different speech contrasts. Nittrouer argues that ''success rates differed across contrasts'' ͑p. 1603͒ and that ''If procedures accounted for a large proportion of variance in success rates, we would have expected those rates to be similar across contrasts'' ͑p. 1603͒. But that statement flies in the face of compelling evidence that performance varies with simple acoustic parameters ͑e.g., changes in tone frequency͒ in the conditioned headturning paradigm ͑e.g., Olsho, 1984; Sinnott and Aslin, 1985͒ . This finding that some distinctions are more difficult than others holds across a variety of methodologies in addition to conditioned headturning. These include visual habituation, heart rate deceleration, and mismatch negativity ͑MMN͒ in the event related potential ͑ERP͒ recorded from scalp electrodes. Yet, importantly, in all of these tasks infants consistently perform better on between-than on within-category differences ͑Miller and Morse, 1976; Best, 1994; Dehaene-Lambertz and Baillet, 1998͒ . In addition to differences in discrimination, infants are better able to categorize some stimuli than others. At 6 -8 months of age they treat multiple instances from within a dental category as equivalent, and as different from multiple instances from a retroflex category, whereas they fail to categorize instances that span the dental/retroflex category boundary ͑Werker and Lalonde, 1988͒. It is this relative pattern of performance, rather than absolute levels of discriminability, which is important.
Second, no technique used to assess any aspect of infant performance succeeds in obtaining precisely the same data from the same infants upon repeated testing. Infants are notoriously difficult to test. We cannot directly instruct infants on the nature of experimental tasks, and their short attention spans preclude gradual shaping of desired behaviors. Rather, at best, procedures can be set up to maximize the likelihood that most infants will be sufficiently engaged in the task at hand to form approximately correct inductions about its nature most of the time. Thus, one has to work very hard to establish optimal conditions to obtain even adequate performance. Nittrouer's placement of infants in a car seat or highchair alters the typical context in which testing is conducted in the conditioned headturning procedure and could easily result in suboptimal performance. Similarly, use of a very few test trials sets a strict standard that only a few infants, even under optimal conditions, will meet. For example, Nittrouer used a fixed criterion of 8 out of 10 correct responses to change trials as a threshold for concluding that infants discriminated a specific speech contrast. She notes that Werker's lab has used this same criterion in the past. However, with the exception of Werker and Tees ͑1984͒, where the criterion was 8 out of 10 responses to change trials only, Werker's lab has more typically used a floating criterion of correct responses to both change and control trials within a total of 25 trials. Thus, Nittrouer's criterion for successful discrimination is considerably more stringent than that of Werker and other researchers in the field who use the conditioned headturning technique.
As a result of her experiments with infants, Nittrouer ͑2001͒ expresses surprise that only 65% of her subjects discriminated the vowel contrasts and only 35% discriminated the consonant contrasts. But why should we expect all infants to ''pass'' a test of discrimination, particularly with her testing setup and performance criterion? Surely an inattentive adult would show less than perfect performance on any task, and infants are not immune from such lapses of attention and motivation. Nittrouer argues that these task variables should be independent of the difficulty of the speech contrast. But that argument is simply not compelling: surely one would expect performance to vary with task difficulty even if there are general task variables ͑e.g., criterion effects͒ operating to reduce optimal performance. These issues are moot, however, because Nittrouer claims that her data are not that different from what others have reported in the literature. Why then does she come to such a different conclusion about innate phonetic categories?
A key difference between Nittrouer's interpretation of her data and that of others in the field is that she holds an idealized view of categorical perception. This view posits that labeling functions have sharp category boundaries and that within-category discrimination is at chance while between-category discrimination is at ceiling. The problem is that no data from infants have ever supported such a ''strictly categorical'' view of speech perception. In fact, there are no labeling data at all from infants to complement their discontinuous discrimination data. Thus, at best, the infant literature supports a weak view of categorical perception. Interestingly, the adult literature supports a similar view, with reaction time ͑Pisoni and Tash, 1974͒, goodness ratings ͑Miller, 1994͒, and same-different judgments ͑Carney et al., 1977͒ supporting a less definitive view of categorical perception than originally attributed to Liberman et al. ͑1967͒ . But of course this does not imply, as suggested by Nittrouer, that ''Perhaps we should not even be asking if infants have wellformed phonetic categories, separated by boundaries, but rather if any language users do. In other words, the very concept of categories, and even more so of boundaries, needs to be reconsidered'' ͑p. 1604͒. Clearly, there is an interpretive agenda here that goes well beyond the infant data that Nittrouer reports and compares to the existing infant data in the literature: ''we have no evidence that boundaries exist in the natural world, or any account of how or why they might have evolved by natural selection. To extend to them any degree of psychological reality is unsupportable, and deleterious to efforts to understand how phonetic structure is indeed instantiated and retrieved from the speech signal'' ͑p. 1604͒. One can only imagine what Nittrouer believes is a sufficient replacement for the notion of speech categories ͑and their logically necessary boundaries͒ since she offers no such account.
In summary, Nittrouer ͑2001͒ has provided a naive and incomplete view of Universal Theory and of categorical perception. She used methods commonly employed in the infant speech perception literature, though in a strikingly suboptimal manner. As a result, her findings on speech discrimination are at the low end of those reported previously. This combination of factors-weak data and an idealized view of Universal Theory and categorical perceptionled her to conclude that infants have no phonetic categories or boundaries between them. We believe these conclusions are misleading and do not fairly represent the current thinking in the field of infant speech perception. While we may disagree about some of the subtle aspects of infant speech perception, Nittrouer's article throws the entire ''baby'' out with a very muddied perspective on the ''bath water.'' As such, Nittrouer's challenge to the field of infant speech perception fails to measure up.
